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ULTRA - LIGHTWEIGHT MUTUAL

AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL WITH
SUBSTITUTION OPERATION

FIG . 2 is an illustration of a communication method
tocol with substitution and permutation operations.
FIG . 3 is an illustration of a communication method

according to an ultra -lightweight mutual authentication pro

BACKGROUND
5 according to an ultra - lightweightmutual authentication pro
with substitution and permutation operations.
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID ) systems may be tocol
FIG . 4 is an illustration of an aircraft delivery center.
passive or active. In a passive RFID system , a passive RFID
tag harvests incident power from an RFID reader to run its
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
circuitry , which transmits information back to the reader. 10
The transmitted information may include unique identifying

information about an asset being tracked , controlled , or
managed .
In certain RFID systems, protecting the privacy of certain
transmitted information is desirable. However, standard

Rat
Reference is made to FIG . 1, which illustrates an RFID
system 110 including an RFID reader 120 and a passive

RFID device 130 . The reader 120 may include circuitry such
as a processor 122 , a transceiver 124 , an antenna 126 , and
cryptographic protocols for authentication and privacy are 15 machine
memory 128 . The memory 128 is encoded
not viable due to limited computational capabilities and with data-readable
that
,
when
executed , causes the reader 120 to emit
constrained energy reserves of the passive tags.
a
magnetic
field
that
provides
operating power to the passive
A certain measure of privacy may be afforded by an
ultra -lightweight protocol. A protocol such as a lightweight RFID device 130 . The executed data may also cause the

mutual authentication protocol (LMAP ) employs simple 20 reader 120 to communicate with the passive device 130 and
bitwise and bit- shift operations , such as AND , OR and XOR . record its observations to a secure database 140 or other
An ultra - lightweight protocol such as Strong Authentication
computer system 140 .

and Strong Integrity (SASI) increases the weak security
The passive device 130 may include circuitry such as a
afforded by simple bitwise operations by adding a rotation
processor 132 , a transceiver 134 , an antenna 136 , and
operation . However, encryption strength is still relatively 25 machine-readable memory 138 , which may be non - volatile.

weak .

Moreover, SASI and other ultra - lightweight protocols are
vulnerable to full disclosure and de -synchronization attacks.
In a full disclosure attack , an attacker exploits certain

Operating power for running the device circuitry may be

harvested from the magnetic field . The memory 138 is
encoded with data that, when executed , causes the passive

vulnerabilities in the protocol to determine secret keys and
other secret information stored in a tag . In a de -synchroni
zation attack , an intruder is not necessarily interested in
knowing the secret information . Rather, the intruder 's goal

device 130 to transmit information back to the reader 120 .
30 The information , which is also stored in the memory 138 ,

It is desirable to improve upon ultra - lightweight protocols
disclosure and de - synchronization attacks .

For instance , the harvested power enables the passive device
130 to operate for only several (e . g ., tens of) milliseconds to
perform and complete a communication session with the

may include secret information , (e .g ., an ID or other unique
identifying information about an asset ) and non -secret infor

mation ( e . g., a field for cyclic redundancy check ). The secret
is to manipulate the system such that the secret keys between
the tag and the reader are not mutually updated . This form
information is encrypted before it is transmitted .
of attack leads to a denial of service because the reader will 35 Unlike the reader 120 , the passive device 130 has limited
not be able to properly authenticate the tag or vice versa .
computational capabilities and constrained energy reserves .

to increase encryption strength and also to thwart full

40 reader 120 . Due to the limited computational capabilities
and constrained energy reserves of the passive device 130 ,
standard cryptographic protocols for authentication and pri
According to an embodiment herein , a method comprises
mprises vacy are not viable .
SUMMARY

using at least one of a passive tag and a reader to exchange
To protect privacy of the secret information , the reader
values according to an ultra- lightweight mutual authentica
-- 45
120
entica
45
120
and the passive device 130 perform information
tion protocol with a substitution operation to change a

exchanges according to an ultra - lightweight mutual authen
protocol with a substitution operation . The substi
According to another embodiment herein , a communica tication
tution
operation
changes a Hamming weight of values being
tions device comprises a processor and memory encoded
exchanged , whereby the number of l ’ s and O ' s in the values
with data for causing the processor to perform information
ng 3050 15is changed . Changing the Hamming weight increases
exchanges with another communications device according
encryption strength over an ultra- lightweight protocol such
to an ultra -lightweight mutual authentication protocolwith a
as
Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (SASI) .
substitution operation .
The substitution operation may be performed in combi
According to another embodiment herein , an article com
prises computer -readable memory encoded with data for nation with a weak encryption method that changes posi
causing an RFID device to exchange values with another 55 tions of the bits in a message. Examples of the weak
Hamming weight of the values .

RFID device according to an ultra -lightweight mutual
authentication protocol with substitution and permutation
operations.

These features and functions may be achieved indepen -

encryption method include, but are not limited to , a bitwise
rotation, swap , or permutation. These operations do not
change the content of a message . The substitution operation ,

on the other hand , changes the content and conceals the

dently in various embodiments or may be combined in other 60 original content. The combination of permutation and sub
embodiments. Further details of the embodiments can be

seen with reference to the following description and draw -

ings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG . 1 is an illustration of an RFID system .

stitution operations can be performed within limited com

putational capabilities and constrained energy reserves of
the passive device 130 .
A rotation operation may be performed instead of the

65 permutation operation . However, the permutation operation
provides a better transposition of data . In the permutation
operation , bits of new positions cannot be easily guessed .
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The permutation operation is not limited to anything in

120 and the passive device 130 according to UMAP -SP. The

particular , so long as the reader 120 and the passive device
130 use the same operation . In some embodiments, a keyed

passive device 130 stores a current key set. The reader 120
has access ( e. g ., via the database 140 ) to a current key set

permutation operation may be used , where the permutation

function depends on a value of a key . In some embodiments, 5

that is associated with the passive device 130 .

At block 210 , the reader 120 initiates a communication

the following keyed permutation may be used . For two n -bit

session . For instance , the reader emits a magnetic field

strings , X and Y , in the form

containing a message . If the passive device 130 is within

X = x1x2 . . . Xn, x ;€ { 0,1 }, i= 1,2 , . . . ,n

range of the reader 120 , the magnetic field will provide
operational power to the passive device 130 . In response to

Y = y?y2 . . . Yn y: {0,1}, i= 1,2 ,. . . ,

10 the message, the passive device 120 sends an acknowledge

If the Hamming weight of Y, wt( Y ), is m (Osmsn ) and
Yk? FYk2 = . . . = ykn = 1
Ykm +1 Þykm +2 = . . . = Yx = 0

ment (e.g ., an index associated with that device 130 ) to the
reader 120 .
At block 220 , the reader 120 uses the acknowledgement
to access the current key set that is associated with that
15 passive device 130 . For instance , the reader 120 accesses the

key set from the database 140 .

where

At block 230 , the passive device 130 and the reader 120
use their respective key sets to perform mutual authentica
tion and then to generate new sets of keys . Permutation and
20 substitution operations are performed during mutual authen

1skiskas . . . Skmsn
and

tication and new key generation .
If the mutual authentication is not successful (block 240 ) ,
1skm + 15km +25 . .. sk,sn
the
reader 120 and the passive device 130 revert to their
then , the permutation of X according to Y is
current key sets ( block 250 ). If mutual authentication is
25 successful (block 240 ), the reader 120 and the passive device
Per (X,Y) =Xkpotky . .. keythey taken -1 . Kkm +2+km=1
130 update their key sets with the new set ofkeys for future
The substitution operation is not limited to anything in authentication
(block 260 ) .

particular, provided that both sides perform the same map
ping. To limit the computations and power consumption , a

The method of FIG . 2 enables secure communications to
be performed in a low power environment with limited

single substitution box (" S -Box ” ) may be used to map the computational capability and limited session time. As will
values (each input value is replaced by a different one using 3030 be
demonstrated below , as few as five exchanges may be
a lookup table ) . In some embodiments , the following sub
ati
performed to authenticate and encrypt.
stitution operation may be used . Let map be the substi
The method of FIG . 2 increases encryption strength , as
tution of the value x by a value in the table whose index is
the
of permutation and substitution is stronger
mod / index (x ) +r, 16 ). For two n -bit strings, X and Y , in the 35 thancombination
simple bitwise operations. The method of FIG . 2 can
form
prevent de - synchronization and full disclosure attacks. The
X = X1X2 . . . Xn, x ;€ {0 ,1 }, i= 1,2 , . . . ,N
set of keys in the passive device changes with each round of
Y = y?y2 . . . Yn y;€ {0 ,1 }, i= 1,2, . . . ,N

authentication , but only if the authentication is successful.

Reference is now made to FIG . 3 , which illustrates a
40 communications method in which only five exchanges

then

between the reader 120 and passive device 130 are needed
to authenticate and encrypt . On the device side, the passive
yi
Sub ( X , Y ) = mapyo
( x ) " map x ) Il

. . . Il map ( x ) , K

device 130 stores its secret key set K1 and K2 and other
secret information including its identifier ID . In this embodi

45 ment, the passive device 130 does not have computational

where || is a concatenation operation , and
Yx = ly4k +1»Y4k+ 23Y4k+3;Y 4k+4)

**= \x 4k+1» ¥4k +2,44k +3,44k +4!
The RFID system 110 may include additional devices,
both active and passive (not shown ). The reader 120 may
have sufficient computational capabilities and constrained

power to generate random numbers.
On the reader side, the database 140 stores information

about the passive device 130 , including its secret key set K1,
and K2 , and its identifier ID . The subscript " r " denotes
50 information on the reader side , which may be different than

the corresponding information on the device side. The
tional passive devices.
database 140 may also store information about any addi

energy reserves to communicate with multiple devices
Communication begins with first and second exchanges .
simultaneously and to communicate with the database 140 . 55 The reader 120 broadcasts a message such as " Hello " (block
The reader 120 may communicate with additional passive
310 ). If the passive device 130 is within range of the reader
devices according to an ultra -lightweight mutual authenti120 , it responds by sending an index pseudonym (IDS ) to
cation protocol with substitution and permutation operations
the reader 120 (block 320 ). The IDS points to an entry in the
(UMAP -SP ). The reader 120 may communicate with addi- database 140, which contains information about the passive
tional active devices according to UMAP -SP or another 60 device 130 . The IDS may be dynamic . The device ' s ID is
protocol that is more computationally intensive .
kept secret and is not sent at this point.
The RFID system 110 may also include additional readers.
The reader 120 uses the IDS to access the secret infor

(not shown ) that have access to the database 140 . Each
additional reader may communicate with the passive device
120 and any additional RFID devices .
Additional reference is made to FIG . 2 , which illustrates

a high -level communication method performed by the reader

mation about the passive device 130 , including the secret
key set K1, and K2, and the identifier ID , (block 325 ). At
65 this point, the reader 120 would not accept the identity of the
passive device 130 because it has no guarantee that the IDS

came from an authentic passive device 130 .
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The reader 120 and the passive device 130 then exchange
random numbers and perform reader authentication (third

The reader 120 receives the fourth message D , and then
generates a new reader -side IDS* , and key set K1* , and

exchange). In the embodiment of FIG . 3 , two random
numbers n , and n , are exchanged. These random numbers ni

K2* , (block 360 ). The new IDS * ,,and key set K1* , and K2* ,
may generated as follows:

and n , will be used for mutual authentication and generation 5

of new key sets.

K1, * = Per(Sub ( K2, n2),n?)

messages A , B and C and sends the messages to the passive

K2,* = Per( Sub (K1, *,n1),n2)

In some embodiments, the reader 120 generates three

device 130 (block 330 ). The messages A , B and C may be

generated using permutation and substitution operations as 10

follows:

A = Per-'(Sub -'(n?,K1,),K2,)
B = Per- '( Sub - '(n2,K2,),K1, )

IDS, * = Per(Sub (n 1,K2, *),K1,* )

The reader 120 then recreates the fourth message D ,

(block 360 ). The reader 120 may recreate the fourth message

D , as follows:
15

C = Per (Sub( ID „ n?),ny)
where Per- 1 and Sub - 1 are inverse permutation and substi-

D = Per( Sub(ID ,K1 ,*),K2,*)
If D = D ., then the passive device 130 is authenticated to

the reader 120. A new key set K1, * and K2, * and a new

tution operations. The first and second messages A and B are

index pseudonym IDS , * are generated , and the new key set

used to transmit the random numbers n , and n ,. The third 20 K1, * and K2, * is stored in the database 140 at the location

message C will be used for reader authentication .
The reason for using the inverse operation on the reader
side is due to the limited computational capabilities of the

indicated by IDS , * . As a result, the reader 120 willmaintain
two sets of the index and keys . For a subsequent authenti
cation session , the reader 120 determines which set to use

passive device 130. The substitution and permutation opera -

based on the received IDS (either IDS, or IDS,* ).

ward ( inverse ) directions of substitution and permutation.

sage E may instead be another message that is a function of

tions are done only in the forward direction on the device 25 If D = D ,, the key set update is then confirmed ( fifth
side , whereas the reader 120, which has far greater compu exchange ). The reader 120 sends a fifth message E to the
tational resources, can perform both the forward and back - passive device , where E = IDS* , (block 370 ). The fifth mes
In other embodiments , however, the device 130 may be the new keys , but message E = IDS * , avoids giving an
built with an inverse substitution and an inverse permuta - 30 attacker multiple cipher texts .

tion . In those embodiments , the messages A and B may be

generated with substitution and permutation operations
The passive device 130 then uses its key set K1 and K2
to retrieve the random numbers n , and n , from messages A
and B (block 340 ). The random numbers n , and n , may be 35
retrieved as follows:

ni = Sub (Per (B ,K2),K1)

n2= Sub (Per(B ,K1),K2)
The passive device 130 then uses the random numbers n
and n , and its ID to generate the third message C ', which is
then compared to the message C sent by the reader (block

If E = IDS * , then the key set on the reader side is the same

as the key set on the device side . Therefore, the passive
device 130 replaces the old key set K1 and K2 with the new
key set K1* and K2 * so it can thereafter use the new key set
as the valid set between it and the reader 120 (block 380 ).
The reader 120 should now expect the passive device 130 to

use the new key set in the next authentication session . If, for

any reason , the passive device 130 responds at the beginning

of the new session with the old index pseudonym IDS , then
40 the reader 120 can tell that the previous authentication

session was not successful. If, however, the reader 120
receives the new index pseudonym IDS * , then that confirms
to the reader 120 that no messages were lost during the

340 ). If C = C ', then the reader 120 is authenticated to the
previous authentication session . Thus, by maintaining the
passive device 130 . The passive device 130 may generate 45 old and new sets of keys, the reader 120 avoids the risk of
the third message C ' as follows:

de- synchronization .

If the passive device 130 never receives the fifth message

C'= Per(Sub (ID ,n?),n2)
E ( for instance , due to malicious or innocuous events ), it will
If the reader 120 is authenticated . IDS and key set updates retain the old key set K1 and K2 and will not update to the
are performed ( fourth exchange ). Using the random num - 50 new key set K1" and K2* .
bers n , and n , and its key set K1 and K2, the passive device
The method of FIG . 3 offers advantages other than
130 generates a new IDS * and a new key set K1* and K2*
increasing encryption strength and thwarting full disclosure

(block 350 ). The new IDS* and new key set K1* and K2 *

may generated as follows:
K1* = Per( Sub (K2,n2),n?)

and de-synchronization attacks. The method offers forward
security . The goal of forward security is to guarantee that a
disclosure of the secrets at any time will not lead to

disclosing all previous communications. Since the new set

of keys depends on random numbers , which are not known
K2* = Per(Sub (K )*,n?),n2)

to the attacker, the attacker will not be able to disclose the

previous sets of keys and will only be able to reveal the
60 current and all subsequent messages .

IDS * = Per( Sub(n1,K2* ),K * )
The method includes a double key confirmation , which
The passive device 130 also generates a fourth message D enables
the reader 120 to implicitly determine whether the
and sends that message D to the reader 120 (block 350 ). This last update
was successful. The method also includes a
fourth message D will be used for authentication of the double key update
mitigates the effect of replayed
passive device 130 to the reader 120 . The fourth message D 65 messages, which can, which
occur during replay attacks.
may be generated as follows:
The method of FIG . 3 may instead use multiple rounds for
D = Per(Sub (ID ,K * ),K _* )
computing the secret keys. For example , permute -substitute

US 10 ,198 ,605 B1
permute -substitute (P - S -P -S )may increase security, but also
increases the total number of computations.

current reader-side key set associated with the passive tag ;

A method herein is not limited to two secret keys and two
random numbers. More than two keys and random numbers

and wherein during a communication session , the passive
tag and the reader use their respective key sets to perform
mutual authentication and then to generate new sets of keys ,

attempts to perform a brute force attack , but at the expense

ing the mutual authentication and new key generation .

be applied to other systems including readers and tags .

7 . The method of claim 6 , wherein the reader and the
passive tag each generates its own new key set using shared

may be used to add to the complexity in case an intruder 5 the permutation and substitution operations performed dur
of more storage on both the reader and the passive device .
A method herein is not limited to RFID systems. It may
ay

numbers .
A method herein is not limited to any particular applica - 10 random
8. Themethod of claim 6 , wherein the currentkey sets are

tion . Examples include, but are not limited to , asset man

agement, supply chain management, and the management of
finance data and credit information .

Consider the case of asset management, where different

used to authenticate the reader to the passive tag , and the
new key sets are used to authenticate the passive tag to the
reader.

data without sharing the data with the other parties in the

9 . The method of claim 6 , wherein if the mutual authen
tication is not successful, the passive tag reverts to its current
key set; otherwise, the passive tag updates its key set with

Even if assets are controlled entirely by a single party at

10 . The method of claim 9 , wherein the reader maintains

parties have assets ( e . g ., tools , parts ) located in a building . 15

A method herein would allow one party to send and receive

building .

the new set of keys for future authentication .

a single site, a method herein may be used to protect those 20 its current and new key sets even if themutualauthentication
assets from intruders . For instance , assets are managed on a is successful.
site that is adjacent to property that is publicly owned or

11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the reader deter

owned by another party . A method herein can thwart intrud -

mines which key set to use based on a received index

ers from receiving secret information via commercially

pseudonym (IDS) from the passive tag .

available readers on the adjacent property .
25
12 . The method of claim 6 , wherein a first exchange
Reference is now made to FIG . 4 . One particular example
between the reader and the passive tag is initiated by the

of asset management involves an aircraft delivery center

410. The aircraft delivery center 410 includes a plurality of

reader , wherein the passive tag responds with a second

exchange by sending an index pseudonym ( IDS) to the

aircraft stalls 420 and a plurality of buildings 430 . Located
reader, and wherein the reader uses the IDS to access its key
within the delivery center 410 are assets including, but not 30 set associated with the passive tag.

limited to , aircraft, ground support equipment, test equip 13 . The method of claim 12 , wherein a third exchange
ment and tools. Some or all of these assets may be tagged between the reader and the passive tag is performed , with the
with passive RFID devices. RFID readers may be located in
reader generating random numbers , creating encrypted mes
each aircraft stall . For instance , RFID readers may be sages from the random numbers and identifier (ID ) using its
installed on poles or attached to light posts . RFID readers 35 current key set, and sending the messages to the passive tag ,
may also be located on top of small buildings 430 .
which uses its current key set to recover the random numbers
The aircraft delivery center 410 may be owned by a and authenticate the reader to the passive tag .
company . However, the delivery center 410 is adjacent to
14 . Themethod of claim 13, wherein the reader generates
land that is not owned by that company. In the example of the messages using inverse substitution and inverse permu
FIG . 4 , the aircraft delivery center 410 is adjacent to public 40 tation so that the passive tag performs the substitution and
property ( e .g ., roads and public parking) 440 and an airport permutation only in a forward direction .

450. The airport 450 is where test flights are performed by
company pilots prior to delivery to airline carriers . To
protect the privacy of the assets , the passive RFID devices

15 . Themethod of claim 13 , wherein a fourth exchange
the reader generates a new key set and IDS using the

between the reader and the passive tag is performed , wherein

may communicate with the readers in accordance with a 45 reader - side current key set and ID ; and wherein the passive

method herein .
The invention claimed is :

1 . A method comprising using at least one of a reader and

a passive tag to exchange values according to an ultra -

tag generates a new key set and IDS using the device-side
current key set and ID .
16 . The method of claim 15 , wherein a fifth exchange
confirms the passive tag to the reader, wherein the reader

lightweight mutual authentication protocol with a substitu - 50 saves the new key set and IDS and sends a confirmation

tion operation , the substitution operation being performed message to the passive tag .
during each mutual authentication and changing a Hamming
17 . The method of claim 16 , wherein the passive tag
weight of each of the values exchanged .
updates its key set if and only if it receives the confirmation
2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the reader is an RFID
message .
reader and wherein the passive tag is a passive RFID device . 55 18 . A communications device comprising a processor and
3 . The method of claim 2 , wherein a weak encryption

memory encoded with data for causing the processor to

operation is used in combination with the substitution opera -

perform information exchanges with another communica

tion ; and wherein the passive tag performs the substitution

tions device according to an ultra - lightweight mutual

operation only in a forward direction and the RFID reader

authentication protocol with a substitution operation , the

performs the substitution operation in both forward and 60 substitution operation being performed during each mutual

backward directions.
4 . The method of claim 3 , wherein the weak encryption
operation includes a permutation operation .
5 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the permutation

operation is a keyed permutation operation .

authentication and changing a Hamming weight of each of
the values exchanged .
19 . An article comprising computer- readable memory

encoded with data for causing an RFID device to exchange

65 values with another RFID device according to an ultra
lightweight mutual authentication protocol with substitution
a current device -side key set, and the reader accesses a and permutation operations, the substitution operation being
6 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the passive tag stores
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performed during each mutual authentication and changing
a Hamming weight of each of the values exchanged .

20 . The article of claim 19, wherein the data further
causes the RFID device to function as a passive RFID tag.

